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Abstract
This article looks at the theory and empirical findings of excessive compensation on the recent financial implosion across
institutional forms in banking. Compensation levels have gone up dramatically over the last 30 years as deregulation and
concentration have grown. Some banks and quite a few credit unions avoided closure by prudent portfolio selection and
keeping reserves up by maintaining compensation levels closer to the median level. Empirical findings here are based on a
unique panel data set on U.S. commercial banks, thrifts, and credit unions from 1994 through 2010 (more than 300,000
observations) that provide evidence that the firms with the highest net worth typically are smaller institutions, are credit
unions, have smaller insider loans as a percentage of assets, and have lower average pay levels. The favorable results here
for credit unions, financial cooperatives, should help guide policy when deciding which type of financial institutions should be
encouraged.
Keywords
banks, capital, credit unions, crisis, great recession, compensation
The global financial crisis at the time of this writing is going
on for 4 years. Although there have been positive signs that
the “Great Recession” may be coming to an end, high unemployment, the continued slow progress in the mortgage crisis, and sovereign debt exposure point to continued difficulty
in keeping banking institutions well capitalized.
Capitalization allows banks and credit unions to withstand
minor setbacks and helps keep defenses stronger in case of
systemic shocks. Given the attempts to redress the financial
institutions taken by a number of governments and organizations, threats to bank solvency that were often passed over
have recently garnered greater attention (e.g., Congressional
Oversight Panel, 2010, 2011; McKillop, Ward, & Wilson,
2010; Walter, 2010). Why is it that credit unions received
much less public support than other institutions in the United
States? Is this lack of support due to less need, unlike that
found by Allen Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck (2012)
when considering recent developments in Germany, less
political power, or being considered small enough to fail?
Some have cited declining ethical standards (Volcker, 2011)
or internal factors such as excessive compensation for the
collapse of so many institutions. The threat of out of control
compensation practices to a healthy financial system is
severe enough that new guidelines are in the process of being
formulated by a number of regulatory bodies including the
Federal Reserve in the United States (2011) and the Bank for
International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland (2011). Some

have pointed to the level of pay, and others have focused on
the incentive schemes that are offered. Financial institutions
typically have had the highest pay among industries, and at
least top-level executives have, in many cases, incentive
compensation based on firm performance. These schemes
have often been shown to have positive impacts on performance in a number of industries. The problem with some of
these compensation schemes is that they have not been
adjusted for the risk imposed on the institution. Corporate
governance issues have been brought to the fore by these
compensation issues as well. Have the board of directors and
management given enough attention to the risk that these
practices place on the institution, or have they been aware of
the probable consequences and their own personal incentives
are so short term that future institutional collapse is not a
consideration? Shareholders as well as taxpayers in a number
of countries believe that compensation has gone too far and
have been openly challenging executives at companies like
Citigroup, Barclays, and Credit Suisse (Schafer, 2012). This
article will answer some of these questions concerning the
dangers of mismanaging compensation. Data collected from
1

University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, USA

Corresponding Author:
Mark A. Klinedinst, Professor of Economics, University of Southern
Mississippi, 118 College Drive #5108, Hattiesburg, MS 39406, USA.
Email: mklinedinst@mac.com

Creative Commons CC-BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
(http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of
the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages
(https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).

2
1994 to 2010 on U.S. credit unions, banks, and thrifts provide a rich resource to analyze the changes in capitalization.
The next section will discuss the theory of capitalization
and compensation as it relates to financial institutions. The
third section of the article will address the data used and the
empirical strategy. The results of the statistical analysis will
be considered in the fourth section followed by the policy
implications.

Theory of Capitalization and
Compensation
Capital acts not only to provide financial institutions the
liquidity necessary to take advantage of opportunities but
also as an important buffer in case of distressed asset values.
Historically capital levels were much higher when there was
no clear lender of last resort. Bank capital in the 1800s typically ranged from 20% to 50% of assets, much higher than
the approximately 10% that is seen recently (Dwyer, 2011).
The higher leverage ratio seen before this recession makes
institutions more susceptible to even moderate fluctuations
in assets. The lender of last resort function and the deposit
insurance programs of the last 100 years also come with capitalization standards that are often perceived as burdensome,
even though well below what existed in the period of “free
market” banking in earlier years. The different stakeholders
of institutions often have divergent goals in regard to capital.
Shareholders interested in maximizing income typically
want less than the credit rating agencies due to the opportunity costs of maintaining high liquidity than do depositors
and regulators who want to be protected from loss (Allen,
2006; Doyran, 2011). Credit unions, unlike commercial
banks, are financial cooperatives and have depositors who
are also the claimants on the residual income as well as being
able to determine the composition of the board of directors
(Jones, Kalmi, & Kauhanen, 2012). All institutions wishing
to avoid “prompt corrective action” (PCA) by regulatory
authorities will attempt to meet the minimum capital standards for being “well capitalized” set by the relevant regulator (Elizalde & Repullo, 2006).
Compensation practices at financial institutions have
been controversial especially lately due to the relatively high
levels of pay and the risks that are thought to have been magnified by incentive compensation schemes. The banking
industry has one of the highest levels of pay of any industry
in the United States especially investment banking and even
after accounting for differences in human capital (Cai &
Milbourn, 2010; Philippon & Reshef, 2012). Given the
recent crisis with substantial taxpayer bailouts since 2007
(Gilbert, Kliesen, Meyer, & Wheelock, 2012), with compensation still quite high, has a number of shareholders and taxpayers feeling that their money has been misspent and that
the high pay actually makes default risk higher (Thanassoulis,
2012). In 2010, compensation at publicly traded banks
reached a record US$135 billion (Lucchetti & Grocer, 2011).
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Even in the midst of the recession in 2009, these same companies paid US$128 billion in pay. Many argue that many of
these companies would have been bankrupt and closed if not
for the infusions from the Fed and the government (Aubuchon
& Wheelock, 2010; Taibbi, 2011). One of the more discussed
cases is that of the investment bank of Goldman Sachs
(2011), which recently paid approximately US$500,000 in
average compensation. A high percentage of compensation
among banks, especially among senior management, comes
from incentive schemes such as bonuses and stock options
(Rosen, 2002). Incentive schemes such as these are often
thought to bring increased firm productivity in a wide variety
of industries (FitzRoy et al., 1998; Klinedinst, 2003; Kruse
& Blasi, 1997). Although these variable pay schemes are
often associated with greater efficiency in many industries, it
is clear in banking that they may also contribute to greater
risk (Federal Reserve, Board of Governors, 2011). This
greater risk is a problem that derives not only from seniorlevel executives’ compensation but also from employees in
areas where the desire to earn bonuses in the short run is not
adequately matched to the long-run implications of their
decisions (Financial Stability Board, 2012). This agency
problem of improper incentives runs through institutions all
the way to the board of directors (Brown, 2009; Group of 30,
2012). Compensation being at odds with the interests of
stakeholders was brought to the attention of the mainstream
economics profession by Berle and Means (1932) in their
book The Modern Corporation and Private Property,
we are dealing not only with distinct but often opposing groups,
ownership on the one side, control on the other—a control which
tends to move further and further away from ownership and
ultimately to lie in the hands of management itself, a management
capable of perpetuating its own position. (p. 124)

Robert Hoel (2011) recently pointed out a similar problem in
credit unions as well,
Owner power evolves as the organization grows in size and
complexity. Management becomes the most powerful actor in
governance. (p. 21)

The degree to which this increased power translates into
more firm earnings ending up in executive compensation
rather than capital to protect shareholders, customers, and
regulators is what this article hopes to empirically
investigate.

Data and Empirical Strategy
Data used here come from publicly available series on all
credit unions, thrifts, and commercial banks in the United
States from 1994 until the end of 2010. These annual data are
relatively unique with more than 322,000 observations
allowing a comparison of the strengths of various institutional forms through prosperous economic times and into the
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Table 1. Institutional Form Over Time.
Institution
Total
Credit unions
Savings banks
Commercial banks
Giants (assets above US$50 billion)a

Number
in 1994

Number
in 2000

Number
in 2007

Number
in 2010

Percentage change
1994-2010

Percentage change
2007-2010

24,761
12,199
2,145
10,411
14

20,324
10,439
1,587
8,298
28

16,798
8,267
1,250
7,281
37

15,144
7,488
1,127
6,529
37

−39
−39
−48
−37
164

−9.9
−9.4
−9.8
−10.3
0

a

Firms with more than US$50 billion in assets. There were 494 observations in this group, 56 for savings banks and the rest were for commercial banks.

“Great Recession.” Sources for these online data are the
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA; 2012) and
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC; 2012).
Statistical methods utilizing not only summary statistics but
also regression techniques with numerous controls will be
used to analyze these data. Given that we analyzed data from
different financial institutional forms that often have similar
goals and regulatory constraints but are also distinct, we
allow flexible forms and compare both within and across
institutions. Operationalizing the relations discussed in the
previous section gives a general form such as
Yit =α +βXit +εit .

(1)

The performance indicator, Yit, used here is the firm’s net
worth as a percentage of assets. The intercept, αi, captures
firm specific factors which may be otherwise unseen, while
the X matrix contains policy variables, state dummies, and
regional and time dummies to capture exogenous contemporaneous shocks and policy changes. The use of firm specific
intercepts helps to eliminate bias due to firm heterogeneity
from unmeasured factors (e.g., managerial talent, technology, market share, etc.). Time invariance of a number of
policy variables, however, would mean that when using fixed
effects, these variables’ estimates would be lost. Random
effects estimation allows these parameters to be recovered.
Endogeneity of some of the policy variables in the X matrix
would allow nonspherical error terms; hence, instrumental
estimates are also calculated (Hausman & Taylor, 1981; Im,
Kyung, Seung, Schmidt, & Wooldridge, 1999).
The policy variables include dummies for institutional type
(credit union, thrift, or commercial bank), a dummy for large
size (“giant” more than US$50 billion in assets), and an interaction term for giant firms with average salary per employee,
national unemployment figures, and the Case–Shiller housing
index.

Results
All institutional forms have seen a dramatic decline over the
period from 1994 to 2010. Table 1 shows that credit unions,
savings banks, and commercial banks dropped from a total
of almost 25,000 in 1994 to just over 15,000 by 2010, with
savings bank numbers cut almost in half. This decline in
numbers, in many cases caused by mergers, is reflected in the

fact that large institutions (“giants” in the tables), those with
more than US$50 billion in assets, grew 164% (e.g., Goddard,
McKillop, & Wilson, 2008; U.S. Senate, 2011; Wilcox &
Dopico, 2011). This pace quickened from the end of 2007
until the end of 2010, especially for commercial banks.1
Capital grew substantially for all institutions over the time
period, 344% for all institutions as indicated in Table 2. The
largest growth occurred in commercial banks, second in
credit unions, and savings banks the least. Large institutions
also reported strong growth of 270%. As a percentage of
assets, the growth of capital was less remarkable, but still
positive over the whole period. Credit union’s net worth ratio
was relatively stable at around 10%, whereas all other institutions showed stronger growth at the end of the period to get
to roughly the level the credit unions had over the entire
sample. This higher capital ratio2 for credit unions is in part
a purposeful strategy after the difficult times experienced in
the 1980s (Dywer, Gould, & Lopez, 1999). The largest institutions, starting with 6.55% (a result at odds with Daniel
Bergstresser’s, 2004, work on earlier data), had the farthest
to go and hence recorded the greatest growth at almost 70%.
Figure 1 shows that credit unions had a higher median net
worth over the whole period except for the last year when the
large banks received substantial government assistance. The
growth at the giant institutions is not too surprising given the
largesse of the Federal Reserve to institutions that were “too
big to fail” (Barofsky, 2012; Blinder & Zandi, 2010; Special
Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program,
2012; Taibbi, 2013). Insider loans dropped over the period
for credit unions and commercial banks, but went up by more
than 200% for savings banks. Credit unions started the period
with salaries about half those of the largest firms, closing the
gap partly to about 67% by 2010. Average real salaries grew
by similar amounts for all institutions over the period, except
for the giants, which had much higher salaries than the others
initially. Figure 2 shows that the ranking of median salaries
over the whole period remains steady with the giants having
the highest median salaries followed by savings banks, commercial banks, and finally the credit unions. It is interesting
to note that the firms with more than a billion dollars of
assets not only had typically higher salaries in 1994 than the
firms with less than US$50 million in assets, but these large
firms had a larger growth rates in salaries from 1994 to 2010.
If the commercial and savings bank employees in 2010
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Table 2. Means and Changes Over Time.
Variable
Capital (2010 dollars)
Credit unions
Savings banks
Commercial banks
Giants (assets above US$50 billion)
Assets (2010 dollars)
Credit unions
Savings banks
Commercial banks
Giants (assets above US$50 billion)
Net worth ratio (capital/assets)
Credit unions
Savings banks
Commercial banks
Giants (assets above US$50 billion)
Insider loans percentage of assets (2010 dollars)
Credit unions
Savings banks
Commercial banks
Giants (assets above US$50 billion)
Average salarya (2010 dollars)
Credit unions
Savings banks
Commercial banks
Giants (assets above US$50 billion)

M
1994

M
2000

M
2010

Percentage change
1994-2010

Number in 2010

US$23.4 m
US$3.2 m
US$51.1 m
US$41.3 m
US$7.4 b
US$297 m
US$33 m
US$649 m
US$532 m
US$112 b
7.90%
9.57%
7.39%
7.76%
6.55%
0.74%
0.57%
0.13%
0.91%
0.20%
US$54,549
US$41,367
US$51,729
US$56,349
US$80,358

US$42.0 m
US$6.1 m
US$80.1 m
US$79.7 m
US$11.9 b
US$486 m
US$53 m
US$958 m
US$939 m
US$154 b
8.65%
11.44%
8.45%
8.49%
7.70%
0.48%
0.48%
0.21%
0.53%
0.26%
US$63,955
US$48,248
US$60,352
US$66,213
US$78,200

US$104.0 m
US$12.4 m
US$131.0 m
US$205.0 m
US$27.4 b
US$942 m
US$124 m
US$1,100 m
US$1,850 m
US$246 b
11.10%
10.03%
11.75%
11.10%
11.13%
0.30%
0.37%
0.42%
0.28%
0.08%
US$78,922
US$59,651
US$76,438
US$81,523
US$89,283

344
288
156
396
270
217
276
70
248
120
40.41
4.83
47.98
43.00
69.97
−60
−35
223
−69
−60
44.68
44.20
47.77
44.67
11.11

15,153
7,488
1,127
6,529
37
15,153
7,488
1,127
6,529
37
15,132
7,484
1,126
6,522
37
15,153
7,488
1,127
6,529
37
14,804
7,173
1,123
6,508
37

US$59,882
US$45,325
US$52,571
US$61,239

US$68,887
US$54,523
US$60,771
US$70,266

US$84,263
US$67,103
US$81,630
US$85,296

40.72
48.05
55.28
39.29

832
169
156
507

US$40,949
US$37,235
US$53,415
US$43,983

US$45,471
US$41,539
US$69,148
US$49,753

US$51,250
US$47,581
US$80,982
US$57,212

25.15
27.79
51.61
30.08

6,045
4,966
136
943

Firms with more than a billion dollars in assets
Average salary (2010 dollars)
Credit unions
Savings banks
Commercial banks
Firms with less than US$50 million in assets
Average salary (2010 dollars)
Credit unions
Savings banks
Commercial banks

Note. m = million; b = billion.
a
A number of outliers were deleted here, mainly due to the fact that some credit unions operate with only volunteers.

(2,083,246 employees) had been paid at the average rate of
credit union employees, the annual savings from even this
limited measure of compensation would be more than US$40
billion. Alternatively, if the compensation in commercial and
savings banks had been used to hire people at the mean salary of credit unions, there could have been more than 740,000
jobs in the industry.
The top and bottom quintiles of all observations ranked
according to net worth as a percentage of assets are reported in
Table 3. This table shows that credit unions overall and throughout the period are more than 70% of the top quintile observations. The top firms are also typically smaller, averaging 182

million in assets and only 36 employees versus 1,230 million
and 225 employees for the bottom quintile. There are about 3
times as many giant institutions in the bottom than in the top.
Insider loans are also smaller in the top quintile, and average
salaries are also lower. It is interesting to note that after trillions
of dollars were injected into the system after 2007 (Blinder &
Zandi, 2010), the percentage of commercial banks, savings
banks, and giants dropped quickly as a percentage of the bottom quintile and the average salary in this quintile continued to
increase. This finding of those institutions with the highest
salaries levels continuing to pay well matches the Federal
Reserve’s finding that “Over the recent three-year period,
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Figure 1. Net worth, 1994-2010 (median).

Figure 2. Salary per employee (median, 2010 dollars).

median net worth decreased for all income groups except the
top decile, for which it was basically unchanged . . .” (Bricker
et al., 2012, p. 6).
Tables 4 and 5 give results based on either the savings
banks as the control dummy or the commercial bank dummy
and with increasing numbers of control variables included.
Regressions with the most controls in these two tables, column 4, were found to be the best fit.3 In both tables, credit
unions are estimated to have a positive and significant impact
on net worth. The difference between savings banks and
commercial banks is often insignificant with savings banks
in the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates showing a positive and significant impact. Given the power and size of large
institutions, a “giant” dummy, which includes a number of

institutions that are typically considered too big to fail and
often hard to measure precise effects (Berger et al., 2012),
shows a positive and significant effect on net worth. It is
interesting to note that if the giant dummy is included without the interaction term for salaries, it becomes negative and
significant (see column 2 of Table 5). This interaction term is
significant and negative indicating high salaries at these
giant institutions detract from the positive scale effect and
may be above efficiency wage norms.4
The negative and significant coefficient on salaries gives
some credence to the hypothesis that insiders, executives,
may be paid at such a rate that shareholders suffer. Loans to
insiders are also measured to have an important negative
impact on net worth in both Tables 4 and 5. It might be
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Table 3. Means in Top and Bottom Quintiles According to Net Worth.

Top quintile (66,163 observations)
Net worth ratio (capital/assets)
   Credit unions, percentage of observations in top
quintile
   Savings banks, percentage of observations in top
quintile
   Commercial banks, percentage of observations in top
quintile
   Giants (assets above US$50 billion)
Capital (2010 dollars)
Assets (2010 dollars)
Insider loans, percentage of assets
Average salary (2010 dollars)
Employees
National unemployment
Case–Shiller housing index
Bottom quintile (66,163 observations)
Net worth ratio (capital/assets)
   Credit unions, percentage of observations in top quintile
   Savings banks, percentage of observations in top quintile
   Commercial, percentage of observations in top quintile
   Giants (assets above US$50 billion)
Capital (2010 dollars)
Assets (2010 dollars)
Insider loans, percentage of assets
Average salary (2010 dollars)
Employees
National unemployment
Case–Shiller housing index

All years

1994

2000

2007

2010

21.7%
72.6%

20.0%
72.9%

20.2%
74.6%

24.4%
70.2%

18.8%
72.9%

6.2%

6.2%

5.7%

6.5%

7.3%

21.2%

20.9%

19.7%

23.4%

19.8%

0.1%
US$39.5 m
US$182 m
0.3%
US$66,097
36
5.4%
125.4

0.0%
US$8.9 m
US$44.3 m
0.4%
US$51,232
14
6.1%
78.2

0.0%
US$14.5 m
US$71.9 m
0.5%
US$61,385
22
3.9%
108.1

0.1%
US$59.7 m
US$245 m
0.3%
US$63,919
44
4.6%
170.8

0.3%
US$94.6 m
US$504 m
0.1%
US$81,285
65
9.6%
130.9

7.1%
31.7%
11.0%
57.3%
0.3%
US$86.8 m
US$1,230 m
0.4%
US$70,426
225
5.5%
113.1

6.7%
6.8%
39.8%
24.3%
11.0%
11.5%
49.2%
64.2%
0.2%
0.4%
US$42.3 m US$86.7 m
US$632.0 m US$1,280 m
0.7%
0.5%
US$57,929
US$67,451
153
239
6.1%
3.9%
78.2
108.1

7.7%
20.6%
11.7%
67.7%
0.7%
US$261.0 m
US$3,390 m
0.2%
US$84,623
452
4.6%
170.8

7.4%
46.3%
7.6%
46.1%
0.2%
US$77.7 m
US$1,060 m
0.3%
US$87,989
155
9.6%
130.9

Note. m = million.

argued that average pay may vary over the business cycle;
hence, regressions with employment held constant were performed, not reported here, and show similar results. The
national unemployment rate is also measured, as might be
expected, as having a negative and significant impact on net
worth. The Case–Shiller housing index throughout these two
tables is seen as being positively correlated with net worth.
The unemployment and housing index capture in part the
impact on bank balance sheets of the recently reported drop
of almost 40% in the median net worth of American households of the last few years of this sample (Bricker et al.,
2012).
Tables 6 to 8 allow the effects to be institutional specific
and broken down into different asset sizes. Estimating the
impact on credit unions alone in Table 6 shows that the
impact of salaries and insider loans to typically be not significant. Commercial banks estimated in Table 7 again shows
the positive scale effects of the “giants” but their high salaries have a negative influence on net worth. Even among the
large firms, there are differences across institutional forms,
for example, Navy Federal Credit Union, the largest credit
union with assets of more than US$44 billion in 2010, had

16% higher net worth ratio than the large commercial bank
Goldman Sachs ([.09744 − .08357] / .08357 = .16596), and
Goldman paid on average about 26% more in average salaries ([97,158.97 − 76,787.951] / 76,787.951 = .2653). Note
that this calculation is for 2010 after Goldman received substantial funds from the government and this does not include
incentive payments that were not reported as salaries by
Goldman to the FDIC.5 Although salaries are more often carrying the expected negative sign, they are only significant in
two asset groups. Loans to insiders in all asset groups for
commercial banks are estimated to be negative and significant. The savings bank results in Table 8 mirror more closely
the commercial banks than the credit unions, for example,
the “giants” impact is similar and the loans to insiders all
have the expected negative sign.
The decision of what to pay and whether to make a loan to
an insider could be considered contemporaneous choice variables of the firm, hence simultaneously determined with the
dependent variable. Table 9 shows the Hausman–Taylor
model in column 1 which accounts for this potential endogeniety, which is indicated by the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test,
and allows for time-invariant variables.6 Columns 2 to 4 in
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−0.0023789*** (0.0000748)
0.0001278*** (3.78e-06)

−0.00015792*** (0.0000813)
0.0001761*** (3.17e-06)

3,740.79

no
no
no
322,026
27,328
534.16

−0.001014*** (0.0001472)
−0.0009295*** (0.0000428)

−0.0007999*** (0.0000972)
−0.0020089*** (0.0000163)

no
no
no
322,026

(omitted)
(omitted)
0.4117776*** (0.1086697)
−0.0358363*** (0.0097026)

0.0206296*** (0.0004367)
−0.0031316*** (0.000441)
0.3539562*** (0.0806926)
−0.0319095*** (0.0071653)

(2)
Fixed effects

Note. Savings bank is the excluded dummy. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. OLS = ordinary least squares.
*Significance at the 10% level. ***Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level.

Credit union dummy
Commercial bank dummy
Giant dummy
(Giant) × (Salary per
Employee, log)
Salary per employee, log
Loans to insiders,
percentage of assets, log
Unemployment
Housing index
(Case–Shiller)
Time dummies
Region dummies
State dummies
n
Number of groups
Wald test

(1)
OLS

Table 4. Net Worth as Percentage of Assets, U.S. Data 1994-2010.

no
no
no
322,026
27,328
4,856.91

−0.0023103*** (0.0000732)
0.000133*** (3.77e-06)

−0.0009531*** (0.0001475)
−0.0010342*** (0.0000421)

0.0175124*** (0.0019587)
−0.0023336 (0.0020864)
0.4022307*** (0.1029898)
−0.0352106*** (0.0091695)

(3)
Random effects

yes
yes
yes
322,026
27,328
54,367.48

−0.0005126*** (0.0000976)
0.0002436*** (4.64e-06)

−0.0010467*** (0.0001477)
−0.0010571*** (0.0000421)

0.0170666*** (0.0019539)
−0.002071 (0.0021406)
0.409567*** (0.1010749)
−0.0361382*** (0.0089964)

(4)
Random effects
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−0.0015801*** (0.0000813)
0.0001761*** (3.17e-06)
No
No
No
322,026
27,328
4,272.10

−0.0015792*** (0.0000813)
0.0001761*** (3.17e-06)
No
No
No
322,026
4,272.10

0.0237627*** (0.0002389)
0.0031483*** (0.000441)
−0.0051602* (0.0029208)
(omitted)
−0.0008058*** (0.0000972)
−0.0020082*** (0.0000163)

0.0237612*** (0.0002389)
0.0031316*** (0.000441)
0.3539562*** (0.0806926)
−0.0319095*** (0.0071653)
−0.0007999*** (0.0000972)
−0.0020089*** (0.0000163)

(2)
OLS

Note. Commercial bank is the excluded dummy. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. OLS = ordinary least squares.
*Significance at the 10% level. ***Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level.

Credit union dummy
Savings bank dummy
Giant dummy
(Giant) × (Salary per Employee, log)
Salary per employee, log
Loans to insiders, percentage of
assets, log
Unemployment
Housing index (Case–Shiller)
Time dummies
Region dummies
State dummies
n
Number of groups
Wald test

(1)
OLS

Table 5. Net Worth as Percentage of Assets, U.S. Data 1994-2010.

−0.0023103*** (0.0000732)
0.000133*** (3.77e-06)
No
No
No
322,026
27,328
4,856.91

0.019846*** (0.0007921)
0.0023336 (0.0020864)
0.4022307*** (0.1029898)
−0.0352106*** (0.0091695)
−0.0009531*** (0.0001475)
−0.0010342*** (0.0000421)

(3)
Random effects

−0.0005126*** (0.0000976)
0. 0002436*** (4.64e-06)
Yes
Yes
Yes
322,026
27,328
54,367.48

0.0191376*** (0.0009133)
0.002071 (0.0021406)
0.409567*** (0.1010749)
−0.0361382*** (0.0089964)
−0.0010467*** (0.0001477)
−0.0010571*** (0.0000421)

(4)
Random effects
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−0.0038632*** (0.0009002)
0.0009894*** (0.0000553)
Yes
Yes
Yes
74,737
7,333
.08

Yes
Yes
Yes
13,486
1,981
.08

−0.0001491 (0.0001027)

−0.0000307 (0.0001134)

−0.0050149 (0.0045858)
0.0013183*** (0.0002839)

−0.0001992 (0.00024)

0.0000607 (0.0002442)

(2) Less than 10 million
random effects

Yes
Yes
Yes
63,707
5,410
.09

−0.0021128*** (0.000347)
0.0004845*** (0.0000216)

0.0001651** (0.0000751)

0.0000814 (0.0000723)

(3) 10-100 million random
effects

Yes
Yes
Yes
17,978
1,734
.23

0.0021076*** (0.0005177)
0.000045 (0.0000325)

0.0000348 (0.0001689)

−0.0001501 (0.000125)

(4) 100 million to 1 billion
random effectsa

Yes
Yes
Yes
1,571
204
.30

0.0045196*** (0.0010136)
−0.0000719 (0.0000613)

0.0000388 (0.0007585)

0.0006155*** (0.0001854)

(5) Greater than 1 billion
random effects

Note. Credit unions only in different asset groups. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
a
When time dummies are excluded, unemployment and housing have the expected signs and are significant, whereas coefficients on salaries and insider loans stay basically the same.
*Significance at the 10% level. ***Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level.

Salary per employee,
log
Loans to insiders,
percentage of assets,
log
Unemployment
Housing index
(Case–Shiller)
Time dummies
Region dummies
State dummies
n
Number of groups
R2

(1) Less than 1 million
random effects

Table 6. Net Worth as Percentage of Assets, U.S. Data, 1994-2010.
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Yes
Yes
Yes
1,204
346
.39

0.0044926 (0.0000813)
−0.0203889 (0.0011818)

0.0055562 (0.0071846)
−0.0053492*** (0.00011162)

(Omitted)
(Omitted)

(Omitted)
(Omitted)

(3) 100 million to 1 billion
random effects
(Omitted)
(Omitted)

(4) Greater than 1 billion
random effects

Yes
Yes
Yes
64,546
8,139
.08

−0.0011996 (0.001275)
0.0001331* (0.0000744)
Yes
Yes
Yes
64,048
7,823
.05

0.0020727*** (0.0006736)
3.04e-06 (0.0000374)

Yes
Yes
Yes
8,380
1,300
.09

0.0093248*** (0.0017128)
−0.0000504 (0.0001121)

−0.0397644*** (0.0070882)
−0.0017969 (0.0031219)
−0.0047686* (0.0028845)
−0.0034626*** (0.0002327) −0.0009848*** (0.0001568) −0.0021676*** (0.0005115)

(Omitted)
(Omitted)

(2) 10-100 million
random effects

Note. Commercial banks only in different asset groups. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*Significance at the 10% level. ***Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level.

Giant dummy
(Giant) × (Salary per
Employee, log)
Salary per employee, log
Loans to insiders,
percentage of assets, log
Unemployment
Housing index (Case–
Shiller)
Time dummies
Region dummies
State dummies
n
Number of groups
R2

(1) Less than 10 million
random effects

Table 7. Net Worth as Percentage of Assets, U.S. Data, 1994-2010.

Yes
Yes
Yes
8,380
1,300
.15

0.0091502*** (0.0017778)
−0.0000474 (0.0001123)

−0.0035374 (0.0028665)
−0.0021528*** (0.0005142)

0.3459675*** (0.1162098)
−0.0308481*** (0.0102799)

(4) Greater than 1 billion
random effects
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0.0024658 (0.0231918)
0.0004288 (0.0013901)
Yes
Yes
Yes
333
71
.43

0.018593*** (0.0052627)
−0.0034551 (0.0026757)

(Omitted)
(Omitted)

(Omitted)
(Omitted)

(3) 100 million to 1 billion
random effects

−0.0019771 (0.0048255)
0.0005554** (0.0002767)
Yes
Yes
Yes
7,755
1,008
.04

−0.001122* (0.0006075)
−0.0003461 (0.0003544)

(Omitted)
(Omitted)

(4) Greater than 1 billion
random effects

0.0058923*** (0. 0010503) 0.0105956*** (0.0026956)
−.0001322** (0. 0000652)
−0.0002229 (0.0001554)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
14,750
3,017
1,658
455
.05
.20

−0.0111181 (0.0109974)
0076403*** (0.0020833)
−0.0021306*** (0.0004503) −0.0007269*** (0.0001737)

(Omitted)
(Omitted)

(2) 10-100 million random
effects

Note. Savings banks only in different asset groups. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*Significance at the 10% level. ***Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level.

Giant dummy
(Giant) × (Salary per Employee,
log)
Salary per employee, log
Loans to insiders, percentage of
assets, log
Unemployment
Housing index (Case–Shiller)
Time dummies
Region dummies
State dummies
n
Number of groups
R2

(1) Less than 10 million
random effects

Table 8. Net Worth as Percentage of Assets, U.S. Data, 1994-2010.

0.0108775*** (0.0027178)
−0.0002305 (0.0001566)
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,017
455
.20

−0.0010501* (0.0006262)
−0.000345 (0.0003528)

0.3530486*** (0.1274539)
−0.0326427*** (0.0116646)

(4) Greater than 1 billion
random effects
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0.0240294*** (0.0015789)
0.002993*** (0.0612843)
0.4188775*** (0.0612843)
−0.0368992*** (0.0054632)
−0.0011098*** (0.0000653)
−0.0019306*** (0.0000382)
−0.000754*** (0.000085)
0.0002319*** (3.17e-06)
Yes
Yes
Yes
322,026
27,328
12,916.23

0.0062459*** (0.0001325)
0.0030496*** (0.0002398)
0.0102171*** (0.001583)
−0.0009669*** (0.0003425)
−0.0005126*** (0.0000423)
−0.0013469*** (0.0000299)
−0.0020467*** (0.0001007)
0.0001301*** (7.12e-06)
Yes
Yes
Yes
294,433
157.17

933.76

(3) Change net
worth OLS

0.005564*** (0.0001245)
0.0027251*** (0.0002297)
0.0087982*** (0.0015875)
−0.0009669*** (0.0003425)
−0.0004907*** (0.0000425)
−0.0013416*** (0.0000301)
−0.0034753*** (0.0000669)
0.0000311*** (5.12e-06)
No
No
No
294,433

(2) Change net
worth OLS

0.0088631*** (0.0005937)
0.0011169 (0.0008307)
0.007337*** (0.0024916)
−0.0009329*** (0.0003275)
−0.0005086*** (0.0000388)
−0.0010942*** (0.0000276)
−0.0015204*** (0.0000915)
0.0001005*** (6.46e-06)
Yes
Yes
Yes
294,433
27,328
6,746.23

(4) Change net worth
endogenous random effects

Note. Columns 2 through 4 use first differences of the dependent and right-hand side variables. Commercial bank is the excluded dummy. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. OLS = ordinary
least squares.
*Significance at the 10% level. ***Significance at the 5% level. ***Significance at the 1% level.

Credit union dummy
Savings bank dummy
Giant dummy
(Giant) × (Salary per Employee, log)
Salary per employee, log
Loans to insiders, percentage of assets, log
Unemployment
Housing index (Case–Shiller)
Time dummies
Region dummies
State dummies
n
Number of groups
Wald test

(1) Endogenous random
effects

Table 9. Net Worth as Percentage of Assets, U.S. Data 1994-2010.
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Table 9 are estimated in first differences to show robustness
of the results in the presence of possible unit roots, which
was found not to be the case with augmented Dickey–Fuller
tests.7 The results in Table 9 show similar levels and significance to those found in Tables 4 and 5.

Policy Implications
The results here point to pay levels at large institutions being
high enough to have a negative impact on firm capital levels.
These calculations are made even though the data here probably capture a fraction of the real expenditures that might be
considered part of internal compensation, especially for
executives at larger firms.8 It is interesting to note that the
institutions that received the smallest amount of assistance
from the government, credit unions, also have had consistently high levels of net worth and also pay employees the
least. The high levels of pay seen in the largest institutions
not only are correlated over the whole period with lower net
worth but continued once the “Great Recession” forced taxpayers to help recapitalize what otherwise probably would
have been bankrupt firms. Section 956 of the Dodd–Frank
Act that addresses excessive and misaligned compensation
has been codified by the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, but
their oversight may not always be sufficient without public
and congressional pressure. A number of studies have shown
high wages in many industries are related to firm size, education, and union militancy among other factors. Although we
were not able to control for all of these factors within this
industry, we did control for a number of elements, including,
for example, size, region, insider loans, year, and institutional form, and find that credit unions with all else held constant kept higher reserves to handle a possible downturn
rather than distributing earnings to highly paid executives.
The results reported here also are a reflection of the sentiment of large numbers of U.S. consumers who are transferring their savings to credit unions (Cole, 2012; Gelles, 2011;
Worth, Hampel, & Schenk, 2012). Nevertheless, even these
limited data show a negative correlation with pay, net worth,
and insider loans. Large firms not only pay more, in line with
the hypothesis from Berle and Means (1932), but their pay
has risen at a faster pace than the smaller institutions. Over
the time period of this study, this excess pay relative to the
institutions that did not get bailed out at taxpayer expense
adds up to hundreds of billions of dollars. These billions
could have been given to shareholders or helped prevent possibly the bailouts given by the general public. Recapitalization
of financial institutions is a major concern across the globe,
and the attempt to maintain solvency by requiring sensible
compensation seems to be one of the tools that may help.
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Notes
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

This could be partly attributable to the numerous “bailout”
programs of the Federal Reserve, which committed close to
US$12 trillion (Blinder & Zandi, 2010).
Also called the net worth ratio is the institution’s assets minus
liabilities over total assets.
For example, in Table 4, χ2 of 15,549 with 49 df and a p value
of .00.
It is interesting that when interacting credit unions with average salaries, the term is positive and significant.
In 2007, before the bailouts, Navy Federal Credit Union’s net
worth ratio was 22% higher than Goldman’s, and Goldman
Sachs also paid average salaries that were 37% higher than
Navy’s.
χ2 of 987.97 with 3 df and a p value of .00.
Asymptotic χ2 from a Fisher-type unit-root test of 266.97 and
a p value of .00.
The items not captured by the publicly available data used
here include such expenses as executive office spaces, planes,
deferred compensation, hidden expenses in “research,” and so
on. The salary reported by Goldman Sachs to the Fed for 2010
was US$220 million versus the US$15,376 million reported
in the 2010 Annual Report (220 / 153760 = 0.014). A similar
result holds for Bank of America in 2010, that is, US$18.1 billion reported to the Fed and the annual report lists US$35.1
billion (18066 / 35149 = 0.51).
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